We examine hospital Electronic Medical Record (EMR) vendor adoption patterns and how they relate to market structure. Hospitals have incentives to both coordinate with, and differentiate from, local competitors in their choice of vendors, with some of these incentives even linked to receipt of government subsidies through the HITECH Act of 2009. We find that incentives to coordinate dominate incentives to differentiate overall, and the relative balance grows stronger in favor of coordination as markets become more competitive. Our findings suggest that a potential downside of hospital consolidation, i.e., increased obstacles in information sharing due to vendor differentiation, is a relevant factor that should be taken into account in evaluation of hospital mergers JEL Codes: I12, O33
Introduction
Electronic Medical Records (EMRs) software has become a major industry, with $27 billion in revenues as of 2015.
1 Over the past decade the fraction of hospitals utilizing EMR systems has increased drastically. The U.S. federal government began incentivizing EMR adoption in 2011 and as of 2015, 96% of hospitals have implemented a system that meets government certification standards. 2 There are many EMR products sold by competing vendors that hospitals can chose from, and EMRs sold by different vendors are typically not interoperable. At the same time much of the perceived productivity and health related benefits of EMR adoption hinge on hospitals being able to share patient information electronically. As a result, EMR-adopting hospitals face a classic challenge in networked industries when making their EMR vendor choice -is it optimal to differentiate from or coordinate with competing hospitals?
How hospitals answer this question is of more than just academic interest, and is relevant well beyond just the players in this market. There is significant public interest in these decisions both due to the passing of the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act and challenges facing antitrust agencies in the face of accelerated consolidation in hospital markets. Specifically, the HITECH Act explicitly subsidizes interoperability, pushing hospitals toward coordination. In addition, it is neither theoretically or empirically clear whether changes in hospital competition drive hospitals to coordinate more or less in their vendor choices, rendering any potential coordination benefits or costs from changes in market concentration unclear for antitrust agencies. Understanding this empirical relationship is likely to be particularly important at a time where hospital consolidation has been accelerating.
In this paper, we examine EMR vendor choice by U.S. hospitals for their Clinical Data
Repository (CDR) system -a hospital's database of patient information. We focus on how market competition influences this choice. More specifically, we study whether hospitals exhibit differentiation or coordination relative to their geographic competitors, and whether the level of differentiation or coordination is impacted by competitive market structure.
As in many network technology adoption decisions, hospitals face countervailing incentives in their EMR vendor choice. Choosing the same vendor as local competitors would allow hospitals to exploit network effects, by making it easier to exchange patient information with other local providers. This could have a number of benefits for a hospital. Information exchange can potentially improve patient care and lead to cost efficiency. As an additional incentive for hospitals to coordinate, information exchange and interoperability is a requirement to justify "meaningful use" and qualify for incentive payments under the 2009 HITECH Act.
Coordination in vendor choice also could make adoption less costly. For example, there could be knowledge spillovers from nearby hospitals that could facilitate the adoption and use of an EMR from the same vendor. Lastly, there could be better technical support if vendors tend to invest more resources in markets where they have greater penetration. We categorize those potential benefits as network effects, which could lead to coordination. 3 However, there are also costs associated with choosing the same vendor as local competitors. If hospitals can easily exchange patient information, patients may be more likely to 3 These same network externalities may dampen the rate at which hospitals adopt the technology. Here we focus specifically on which vendor a hospital chooses, conditional on already having chosen to adopt EMR. switch providers. Additionally, if similar EMR systems at nearby hospitals decrease a physician's switching cost, they may be more likely to change hospitals as well. Therefore, hospitals may have incentives to differentiate in order to lock-in their patients and physicians.
We categorize these potential costs as business stealing effects.
Given the countervailing incentives of network and business stealing effects, it is an empirical question of what factors determine their relative strengths and which effect is likely to dominate. In this paper, we characterize the overall net effect of these two forces in EMR adoption by quantifying the extent to which markets exhibit adoption patterns characterized by agglomeration or by dispersion. We then examine the role market concentration plays in determining whether a market is more agglomerated or dispersed. On one hand, greater market concentration could dampen the network benefits, since each hospital is less reliant on coordination with other hospitals. On the other hand, greater market concentration could dampen the business stealing effects since hospitals have less competitive pressure. Our analysis provides direct evidence on how market competition affects the market equilibrium of vendor choice.
We use the multinomial test for agglomeration and dispersion (MTAD) (Augereau et al. Lin 2015), our paper is the first to our knowledge to explicitly examine the role of market structure in shaping the market equilibrium adoption outcomes. Our data allow us to measure market competition in the hospital setting using information on patient admission and to examine how the extent of coordination changes as the competitive landscape changes. Our paper is also different from most of the previous work on standards wars, because, while there is a welldefined choice set for firms to purchase EMR products, there is greater variety than other previously studied industries like internet service providers and banking. In our context 10 firms hold 90% of the market share. Therefore, we are able to explore coordination and differentiation in a context with more options for firms to choose from.
Our paper also makes important contributions to the literature on health information technology. A growing literature explores the determinants of EMR adoption (Dranove et al. 2015b ) and the effects of EMR adoption on outcomes like cost and quality (e.g. Ahga 2014 , McCullough et al. 2013 , Miller and Tucker 2011 , Freedman et al. 2015 , Dranove et al. 2015a (2014) and Lin (2015) .
Hospital Characteristics and Market Structure
We use the American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey of Hospitals to identify hospital characteristics such as geographic location, number of discharges, ownership type, system membership, and teaching status. Some of these hospital characteristics are used as covariates in our regression analysis, which we discuss in more detail in Section 4. The AHA data also allow us to identify a market and construct measures of market structure.
We utilize two alternative definitions of markets, based on Hospital Referral Regions (HRR) and based on counties. HRRs are defined by the Dartmouth Atlas of Healthcare as regional healthcare markets. They are determined based on regions in which most patients in the geographic area are referred to the same set of hospitals for tertiary care. There are 306 HRRs in the country, and our data include hospitals from 299 of these regions. While HRRs provide natural definitions of markets, they may be too large to capture more localized competition and EMR vendor coordination. Therefore, we also explore results using counties as markets. We observe 493 counties with at least two hospitals, which is necessary for calculating our measure of coordination or differentiation. We define market shares for each hospital based on the hospital's share of discharges within its HRR or county. We then use these market shares to calculate HRR and county specific measures of HHI.
We also use data from the Dartmouth Atlas of Healthcare to control for HRR level demographic information. These variables pertain specifically to the Medicare population, but are used as proxies for overall demographic mix of people demanding health care in HRRs.
These variables include the percent above the age of 75, percent white, percent black, percent Hispanic, percent in Fee for Service Medicare, percent in nursing homes, and percent eligible for Medicaid. At the county level, we control for similar variables from the Area Resource File, including the unemployment rate, the uninsurance rate, the poverty rate, and the fraction of the population above the age of 65.
Empirical Methods
The methods we use in this paper build on those in Augereau et al. (2007) B -we would say this market is dispersed. In contrast, if the hospitals all align on this decision, e.g., all choosing vendor A, we would say this market is agglomerated. The essence of the test is that there are many ways to be dispersed but few ways to agglomerate. To see this, note that there are ( 10 5 ) = 252 ways to be dispersed but only one way to be agglomerated on vendor A (and one way to be agglomerated on vendor B).
The MTAD uses the basic combinatorics difference between dispersion and agglomeration -i.e., there are many combinations that lead to dispersion and only few that lead to agglomeration -to construct a test for whether markets exhibit either adoption pattern against the null of independent adoption decisions. More formally, MTAD takes the following approach, which we again illustrate using our example with two vendors. Suppose we assume each hospital adopts exactly one vendor, and the population-level probability of adopting vendor A is pA (implying the probability of adopting vendor B is (1-pA)). Next, suppose we observe a market with 10 hospitals, of which 3 use vendor A and 7 use vendor B. If we treat the adoption decisions as independent, then this observed adoption pattern is the realization of a binomial with 10 draws and probability of adopting vendor A of pA. Hence, the probability of what we observed is:
We can then compare this probability to what we would expect it to be, where we take This intuition easily extends to the more general multinomial case, with more than two adoption possibilities; for example, with three vendors and ten hospitals, the combinatorics become ), where s1 is the number of hospitals adopting vendor 1, and so on.
Formally, we calculate MTAD by taking the log-likelihood of the observed adoption pattern, X, over M markets. We then subtract the expected likelihood from the likelihood of the observed adoption pattern and divide by the standard deviation. As Rysman and Greenstein (2005) show, this statistic converges to a standard normal as the number of markets gets large. 6 We use MTAD to examine whether EMR vendor adoption across markets exhibits a pattern of dispersion or agglomeration. We then break the statistic down to a finer level, and examine whether there is a link between agglomeration/dispersion tendencies and market structure, as measured by the number of hospitals and HHI (with respect to hospitals admissions). When comparing markets, we calculate MTAD based on the expected likelihood and the standard deviation from the group of markets within the same HHI or number-of-firms
It has become increasingly common over the past decade for hospitals to be acquired by multihospital systems. In our main results, we treat hospitals as individual firms, both when calculating MTAD and HHI. We recognize that treating each hospital separately could underestimate MTAD, because hospitals within the same market that are members of the same system are likely to have the same EMR vendor. In fact, 46% of systems with multiple hospitals in the same market adopt the same EMR vendor across each of the hospitals and 80% adopt the same system in at least half of their hospitals. Likewise, treating hospitals as independent will underestimate HHI and make markets appear more competitive than they actually are if hospitals within the same system do not compete against each other. In our regression analysis described 6 A full discussion of the details behind MTAD is in Rysman & Greenstein (2005) . 7 Note that, with a sufficient number of markets, MTAD converges to a standard normal distribution no matter the number of firms or range of HHI; hence any relationship between MTAD and number of firms, or HHI, is not due to the construction of the statistic. We verify this fact empirically via Monte Carlo simulations, where we establish that, under the null of random vendor choice, MTAD does not correlate with number of firms or HHI.
below we control for the fraction of hospitals within a market that are affiliated with a system. In addition, we conduct a separate analysis where we calculate MTAD and HHI treating system hospitals within a market as a single firm. In calculating MTAD in this case, we take the vendor chosen by the most hospitals within the system-market pair as the system's chosen vendor in that market.
Lastly, we use the MTAD statistic within a regression framework in order to again link agglomeration/dispersion to market structure, but including market-level controls. We estimate the following regression equation:
We estimate two versions of this regression, one where is a set of dummies for quintiles based on the number of hospitals in market m and one where is a set of dummies for quintiles of HHI in market m. Note, we define the HHI quintiles with the first quintile being the most concentrated markets so that interpretation of coefficients will be in the same direction as in the number of firms specification.
We will also present estimates adding various sets of control variables. Although endogeneity concerns are not as obvious in this setting compared to one linking price to market structure, these controls can help alleviate potential endogeneity concerns that exist. We first add state dummy variables, , to help control for the possibility that vendors do not all have national reach, and so markets may appear agglomerated only because some vendors were not available. We then add the demographic variables, . These controls could be important if certain population characteristics impact hospital incentives to consolidate and also to coordinate vendors. For example, the fraction of the population in fee for services insurance relative to managed care plans could impact both market structure and EMR coordination incentives. Finally, we add measures of a market's hospital characteristics, ℎ , including the fraction of government owned hospitals, nonprofit owned hospitals, teaching hospitals, and system affiliated hospitals. System ownership in particular could be an important determinant of vendor coordination if markets with a large amount of hospitals within the same system utilize the same EMR vendor.
Results
In this section, we present our main findings concerning agglomeration versus differentiation on EMR vendors in general, and if/how market concentration affects this measure (i.e., MTAD). We then discuss possible endogeneity concerns and their potential impact, and present additional results designed to, at least partially, address them. Lastly, we present some dynamic analysis, where we examine how agglomeration/differentiation has evolved in these markets over time, and the role of concentration on this evolution.
Summary Statistics
Here we present summary statistics of the EMR vendor market and our measures of market structure and coordination. all census regions show evidence of agglomeration, there is some regional variation with the Northeast and South being the most agglomerated, followed by the Midwest and the West. Table 2 also reports summary statistics of market structure overall and by census region, using the HRR market definition. Our markets contain 14.88 firms on average and the mean HHI is 2,517. For our analysis of the relationship between market structure and MTAD, we divide markets into quintiles based on the number of hospitals and based on HHI. Table 3 Table 1 ), but the expected likelihood and standard deviation use those markets within each quintile. MTAD is generally decreasing in the number of hospitals. In the lowest two quintiles, MTAD is negative but close to zero. It is negative in all other quintiles and drops greatly from the fourth to fifth quintile. This suggests that markets with more hospitals are much more agglomerated than markets with fewer hospitals. We find a similar pattern when considering HHI as our measure of market structure. We find a decreasing relationship with respect to competitiveness (or the inverse of HHI), with highly concentrated markets having close to random vendor distributions and very competitive markets having strong agglomeration. measures of competition, and we again find a stark change from the fourth to the fifth quintile. Table 4 provides regression evidence of the relationships plotted in Figure 1 . Column 1 directly corresponds to Figure 1 for number of hospitals and HHI in their respective panels. The coefficients imply a slight negative, though not statistically significant, relationship between competition and MTAD through the first four quintiles with a very large and statistically significant decrease in the fifth quintile (-18.765 for number of hospitals and -23.113 for HHI).
Regression Results
Column 2 adds state fixed effects to control for any regional differences in agglomeration propensity and to account for the fact that some vendors are more prominent in some regions.
These estimates that exploit within state variation in concentration show the same pattern with similar magnitudes. Column 3 adds demographic controls and Column 4 adds hospital characteristic controls. Again, the estimates imply the same pattern, with a large increase in agglomeration (decrease in MTAD) in the fifth quintile.
8 Table 5 presents results at the county level. As at the HRR level, the regression results confirm that the relationships between market structure and MTAD are robust to the inclusion of controls. We find negative coefficients for all quintiles relative to the first quintile, and large, statistically significant coefficients for the fifth quintile.
Our results to this point suggest that incentives to differentiate or coordinate with nearby hospitals vary greatly with market structure. The pattern of results suggests that the network effect outweighs the business stealing effect in EMR adoption, which confirms previous findings such as in Lin (2015). We also find the dominance of the network effect is stronger in highly competitive markets. The stability of these results to state fixed effects and other controls suggests endogeneity may not be a large problem in this context.
Robustness Checks
In this section we discuss a variety of robustness checks and potential endogeneity concerns. Regarding endogeneity concerns, a wide literature in health economics attempts to estimate the causal impact of hospital competition on prices and quality of care (e.g. Dafny 2009 , Gaynor et al. 2013 . One big concern in this literature is reverse causality. For example, a high quality provider in a market will draw more patients and lead to increased concentration.
However, the nature of the identification concern is different in our case. Most unobserved determinants of competition seem unlikely to also relate to which EMR vendor a hospital chooses. That being said, one potential factor that may bias our results is "management quality." Bloom et al. (2015) find that competition leads to better management, as measured from a survey instrument designed to quantify management quality. If better managers are also more or less likely to coordinate vendor choices with nearby hospitals, our estimates may be biased.
However, to the extent that competition is a causal driver of better management, this unobserved factor is not a source of bias, but rather a channel through which competition causes agglomeration or dispersion. Further, we note that it is unclear whether better managers would respond more strongly to differentiation or coordination incentives, so the sign of this bias/effect could be in either direction.
While we cannot explicitly test for the presence of any omitted variable bias that may exist, we believe the robustness of our results to a variety of controls mitigates endogeneity concerns. In order to further mitigate such concerns, we also replicate our HRR-level results using the measure of MTAD calculated in 2012 but with the measure of market structure calculated in 2005. Because both market structure and EMR adoption changed greatly over this time period, we expect unobserved determinants of MTAD to have a much lower correlation with market structure many years earlier. These results are presented in Table 6 at the HRR level, and are very similar to our main results in Table 4 , providing further support to our conclusions.
Another possible endogeneity concern is that there might exist some unobserved marketlevel heterogeneity that affects both entry of hospitals and EMR vendors. For example, a highly profitable market would attract not only more hospitals (which affects market competition), but also more vendors (which affects the choice menu of EMR adoption and therefore our measure of agglomeration and dispersion). However, this would work against our finding that more competitive markets are more agglomerated. Alternatively, certain vendors may specifically target their marketing towards certain types of markets. If a particular set of vendors targeted markets that are also more competitive, our estimates would be biased towards finding an association between competition and agglomeration. We have run regressions of each of the top 10 vendor market shares on our measures of market structure, with results in Table 7 . We do not find any evidence that certain vendors are more likely to have a presence in more competitive markets, suggesting that the overall vendor choice set of hospitals does not depend on hospital market structure.
Finally, we also test whether our results are robust to accounting for multi-hospital systems. First, we calculate our overall measure of MTAD by treating hospitals owned by the same system within a market as a single firm. For example, if an HRR has 10 hospitals, but 3 of them are owned by a single system, we treat this HRR as if it has 8 firms. When calculating MTAD we assign the most commonly chosen vendor of these system hospitals as the firms' vendor choice. We find that the overall value of MTAD is -4.2. While the magnitude is much smaller than our measure that treats each hospital independently, it is still negative and indicates a statistically significant level of agglomeration.
We also estimate regressions with this (system) version of MTAD along with versions of our market structure variables that also treat system hospitals as a single firm within a market when counting the number of hospitals and constructing HHI. The results are presented in Table   8 . Here we find a similar pattern to our main results in Table 4 . We continue to find that more competitive markets have higher levels of agglomeration, particularly in the highest quintile. Not surprisingly, the magnitudes of the coefficients are smaller, since the overall value of MTAD is closer to zero, but the relationship with market structure is similar.
Dynamics
To this point, we have presented results using MTAD measured in 2012. Calculating MTAD in our most recent year of data captures the decisions made by hospitals as EMR technology diffused, and includes decisions made by both "early" and "late" adopters. As of 2012, 89% of hospitals had adopted CDR, but only 68% had adopted as of the beginning of our data period in 2005. In this section we explore how competition impacted the evolution of vendor purchase coordination.
In results not shown, we find that market structure in 2005 is correlated with MTAD in 2005, but the relationship is weaker, with the coefficients smaller in magnitude. In Table 9 we regress the change in MTAD from 2005 to 2012 on baseline 2005 market structure. 9 The results for number of hospitals show that more competitive markets tended to see larger decreases in MTAD over this time period. In particular, with all controls included, MTAD decreased by 10.7 units more in the fifth quintile than in the first quintile. The results for HHI are noisier, but also suggest that MTAD decreased most in the highest quintiles of competition.
Taken with our previous results, these results concerning the dynamics of MTAD suggest that earlier adopters -in our case, those that had adopted by 2005 -exhibited more coordination in more competitive markets. In addition, in more competitive markets, later adopter behavior further exaggerated this relationship. This suggests that competition leads later adopters to be even more likely to coordinate with the adoption decisions of early adopters.
Conclusions
In this paper, we measure whether EMR adoption (specifically CDR adoption) by U.S. hospitals exhibits patterns characterized by agglomeration or by dispersion. We also examine if and how this pattern relates to competition. Using a statistical test of agglomeration and dispersion, MTAD, we find that hospitals tend toward agglomeration, and that the level of agglomeration increases with competition. Hence, as markets become less concentrated, we observe greater tendencies toward agglomeration. This relationship exists for relatively early adopters, i.e., those who had adopted CDR as of 2005, and it becomes even more pronounced as the technology diffused between 2005 and 2012.
Our findings suggest that market forces move hospitals toward potential interoperability.
Future research should further explore whether the HITECH act pushed hospitals to further coordinate vendor choices. Our analysis also takes vendor coordination as a proxy for interoperability. Future research should explore whether hospitals in more competitive markets actually exchange information more fluidly. Our findings also have important implications for antitrust policy. As the hospital market continues to consolidate, our findings suggest that increased concentration may dampen the incentives to coordinate. Notes: Market structure is calculated from the universe of AHA hospitals. Markets are defined by HRRs. Notes: Each column presents results from a different regression at the market level. Markets are defined by HRRs. The dependent variable is MTAD. In these regressions hospitals within the same HRR and owned by the same system are counted as a single firm for calculating both MTAD and market structure. If a system's hospitals use more than one vendor, the most common vendor is used to calculate MTAD. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. *** -p<.01, ** -p<.05, * -p<.10 
